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Docs/Security & Verification/Node Authentication
Security & Verification

Node Authentication

Ed25519 node-to-node authentication, HTTP signature headers, gossip auth, session attestation, and TX-plan quorum witness verification.

#Node Authentication

All node-to-node communication is authenticated using Ed25519 signatures. There is no shared secret, no TLS client certificates, and no central authority. Each node has a persistent Ed25519 keypair that serves as its network identity.

#Cryptographic Primitives

ComponentLibraryPurpose
Ed25519 signaturesTweetNaCl.js (libsodium-compatible)All node signatures
SHA-256 hashing@noble/hashesBody hashing, commitments
JSON serializationCanonical JSON (sorted keys)Deterministic message encoding

#HTTP Request Authentication

Every node-to-node HTTP request includes three headers:

text
X-Node-Pubkey:    <hex-encoded Ed25519 public key>
X-Node-Timestamp: <Unix epoch milliseconds>
X-Node-Signature: <hex-encoded Ed25519 signature>

The signature covers a canonical string constructed as:

text
signedPayload = "${method}:${pathname}:${timestamp}:${bodyHash}"

Where bodyHash is the SHA-256 hex digest of the request body (or empty string for bodyless requests).

Replay protection: the receiving node rejects any request where the timestamp is more than 30 seconds from the receiver's clock. This bounds the replay window without requiring synchronized clocks beyond NTP accuracy.

Body binding: including the body hash in the signed payload prevents an attacker from intercepting a signed request and substituting a different body.

#Gossip Authentication

Gossip protocol messages use a simplified auth scheme:

text
signature = Ed25519.sign("gossip-auth:{timestamp}")

The gossip auth signature is attached to every gossip message and verified by each receiving peer. The timestamp provides the same 30-second replay window as HTTP auth.

#Session Attestation

When a node serves UI content to a client, it produces a session attestation that binds the served content to the serving node and the current cohort:

text
attestationInput = hash(
  sorted(cohortNodeIds) +
  contentHash +
  requestPath +
  servingNodeId +
  timestamp
)

The attestation is signed by the serving node and can be verified by any other node in the cohort. If a node serves tampered content, its attestation will not match what peers expect for the same content hash.

#TX-Plan Quorum Witness Verification

Transaction plans require 2/3 witness agreement before execution. The witness verification process:

  • The transaction plan is broadcast to all quorum members.
  • Each witness independently verifies the plan against its own chain state (via PoA-verified RPC).
  • Witnesses sign their attestation with their Ed25519 key.
  • The coordinator collects attestations and verifies that at least 2/3 of quorum members agree.
  • If fewer than 2/3 agree, the transaction is aborted.

Rogue node detection: if a witness signs contradictory attestations (approving and rejecting the same plan, or approving different plans for the same round), this is flagged as rogue behavior. The detection is deterministic and verifiable by any node holding both conflicting attestations.

#Key Management

  • Node keypairs are generated once and persist across restarts.
  • Public keys are exchanged during node registration and propagated via gossip.
  • There is no key rotation protocol yet; key compromise requires re-registration.
  • All signature verification is strict: malformed signatures, unknown public keys, and expired timestamps result in immediate rejection with no fallback.
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On this page

  • Node Authentication
  • Cryptographic Primitives
  • HTTP Request Authentication
  • Gossip Authentication
  • Session Attestation
  • TX-Plan Quorum Witness Verification
  • Key Management